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The S(ub)lime Symptom and O’Neill’s 
Long Day’s Journey into Night
Wing-chi Ki
There are many ways of reading O’Neill’s plays and in this paper we pose 
the question:  what is it about O’Neill’s plays that convey his understanding of 
the modern tragedy? On analysis, they very quickly reveal a new, tragic sublime, 
one that is inextricably linked to the enjoyment of symptoms. In contrast to the 
Aristotelian paradigm, which foregrounds the tragic jouissance as a result of 
the inevitable “outbound” conﬂicts between human ﬂaws and fateful mishaps, 
O’Neillian theatre addresses the problem of existence in the capitalistic Man. The 
lethal, symptomatic jouissance enlivens the subject, then reduces it to a state of 
deadly inertia, and calmly sends the subject to the realm of the living dead. In the 
words of iek, this deadly existence “is the very opposite of dying.” It is a sublime 
but “horrible fate of being caught in the endless repetitive cycle of wandering 
around in guilt and pain.”1
In most cases, the world of classical tragedy is about the realm of the Real: 
the heroes’ love of the Real Thing, the confrontation of the Real chaos, the heroes’ 
acknowledgement of the nonsymbolizable (Real) laws. According to iek, the 
“paradigmatic case of classical tragedy is that of a hero who commits an act the 
consequences of which are beyond the scope of his knowledge—who unwittingly 
commits crime by violating the sacred order of his community.”2 We can even 
generalize the development of some classical tragedies using this formula: 
“Master—Desire—Thing.” The hero is by nature a discursive master capable of 
turning an existing master signiﬁer for his own use, thus inventing his own master’s 
discourse (e.g. Macbeth’s own “power” discourse, Hamlet’s “intellectual doubt”). 
Eventually, the subject is so much otherized by this grand signiﬁer that he forsakes 
his well-being to desire the unattainable and the transgressive (the primordial 
“Thing”). He thereby ends up becoming a spectacular “Thing” in the eyes of the 
audience. In classical tragedy, the problem of “desire” becomes paramount for 
the hero and rules out the possibility of metonymic substitutions by turning back 
against the homeostatic pleasure principle. Lacan explains the relation of desire, 
pleasure, and metonymic substitution in this way:  the child desires the mother 
and is punished or castrated by the father’s law. Henceforth, upon its entry in the 
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Symbolic order, the child learns to repress his primordial desire and remains happy 
with his endless metonymic substitutes in the signifying chain (e.g. cars, careers, 
travels). As the substitute is never as good as the original objet a, the child’s growth 
involves a double refusal:  the “primordial refusal” (Versagung originelle) of the 
mythical object and the “self-refusal” to consent to the substituting signiﬁers. 
However, tragedy highlights the fact that, at some point, the master wants to 
“act in conformity with his desire.” The hero would rather brave the question of 
non-being than accepting a substitute. The reason why acting in conformity with 
one’s desire means tragedy is twofold. First, Lacan points out that the human’s 
true object of desire is always the desire for the Thing—i.e., the (m)Other. While 
the pleasure principle commands desire to circle round the (m)Other, if the hero 
acts “in conformity with his desire,” he will transgress the Oedipal law and invite 
divine punishment. Second, Lacan has little problem in pointing out that the hero’s 
“going beyond the pleasure principle” is also the desire for death, since the Thing 
is situated in the realm of the Real (i.e., confusion and chaos), anybody who dares 
go near it will be traumatized and consumed. 
Oedipus Rex and Antigone are perfect examples to illustrate this formula. In 
the case of Oedipus, the love of “Truth” has enabled Oedipus to fathom the secrets 
of the Sphinx and become a master, but his desire for “Truth” has also led him to 
the fatal discovery that he has violated the incest taboo. As a result, the gouging 
out of his own eyes signiﬁes not only Oedipus’ abject Thing-like status, but also 
the Thingness of Truth for no prophecy can foretell it. Truth tends to “slip into 
a liminal boundary between its existence in the Real and its existence only as a 
(belated) representation.”3 On the other hand, Antigone is so structured by “family 
ethics” that she posits herself not as a ﬁancée but solely as Polynices’ sister at the 
very beginning of the play. The logic of her ethics decrees her self-mastering action, 
i.e., to bury her brother’s corpse—a “Thing” lying out there—though she knows 
his very behaviour is indefensible in the eyes of the world. Although Antigone 
bemoans her state of being, her (genuine) voice is ultimately barred by this desire 
for the ethical signiﬁer. Antigone’s entombment makes her a “beautiful Thing” for 
it commemorates the courage of an abject woman who dares to act in conformity 
with her desire (which is also the ethical Other’s desire). In many cases, the power 
of classical tragedy always lies in portraying the sublimity of the Real:  the master 
(e.g. Romeo) recklessly pursues the barred object of desire (his love), the hero, 
braving the horror of transgression and his Real destiny, then becomes a Thing. 
The paradox is that the chaotic Real in fact leads to the audience’s embrace of 
the Law and moral catharsis. The heroes’ suffering allows the audience to have a 
glimpse of the shocking “Thing,” and the tragic ending enables them to accept the 
metonymic logic in the core of the homeostatic pleasure principle. 
If the Real plays a dominant role in classical tragedy, the O’Neillian theatre is a 
perfectly logical space devoted to the tragic facet of the Symbolic. In fact, O’Neill’s 
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plays endorse a new formula:  “Subject—Disavowal—Symptom.” The hero is not a 
master by nature; however, he is subjectiﬁed by the capitalistic discourse to become 
the “economic Man.” Pettigrew’s words offer a succinct explanation of this idea: 
“‘Your money or your life!’ exclaims Lacan (XI, 212). If you accept the signiﬁer, 
you lose Being. This is why Lacan speaks quite dramatically of the lethal signiﬁer, 
the ‘lethal factor’ (XI, 213). However, if you refuse the signiﬁer, you fall into non-
meaning.”4 In the O’Neillian context, the lethal signiﬁer is indeed “Capital” for it 
opens up a new world of (false) enjoyment for the subject to recognize reality. In 
Long Day, James Tyrone valorizes his cultural capital to become a famous Actor, 
and he subsequently entwines himself to the capitalistic discourse and befriends 
McGuire—a false friend—in order to be a “a cunning real estate speculator.”5 He 
suffers many losses due to McGuire’s advice, but he chooses to remember buying 
Chestnut Street, McGuire’s “famous one stroke of good luck.” While the subject 
half-knows its misrecognition, O’Neill’s plays often lead us to see how the process 
of “fetishistic disavowal” can effectively forestall the subject from demystifying 
reality. 
In the words of Laplanche and Pontalis, disavowal is a “speciﬁc mode of 
defence which consists in the subject’s refusing to recognize the reality of a 
traumatic perception.”6 Disavowal thrives on the principle of metaphor (e.g. the 
miser believes that “money is everything,” the alcoholic says “the bottle is my 
life”). It reveals the fact that the subject is knowingly covering up a lack, i.e., the 
non-sense, the non-enjoyment of the fetish. As iek says, the fetishist’s “I know 
but nevertheless” is exactly the key to understanding this problem:  the subject is 
“not fetishizing commodities or money, but actually the fantasy itself.”7 To explain 
this clearly, the fetish functions at two levels. The fetish is ﬁrst portrayed by the 
Other as a sensational, mythical objet a, a “Real object of fullness”. After the 
subject’s ﬁrsthand experience of it, it empirically becomes an unfulﬁlling object 
(after all, money is a stack of coins and paper, the bottle makes one weak). The 
fetish is then realized to be an empty objet a, a “false real” (to use the words of 
Alain-Jacques Miller). However, the metaphoric mechanism of disavowal helps 
hide the authentic experience to allow the subject to (make-)believe in the power 
of the mythical, omnipotent fetish, so much so that the subject’s fantasmal being 
qua the fetish (e.g. capital, bottle) becomes “more to him than himself”. Here, the 
disavowal is essentially a disavowal of the empirical truth to embrace a symbolic 
enjoyment, a happiness that is decreed not by the self but by the Other. Through 
the voice of the Other, the subject also endorses a disavowal of the Real (chaos, 
accident) to (make) believe that reality can be contained by the potent signiﬁer. 
The miser always speaks as if money is the be-all and end-all of life, for it “can 
solve all problems.” The disavowal of the poverty of the Symbolic enables the 
subject to exist, to anchor itself ﬁrmly in the sterile happy discourse of the world, 
to identify with the self-deluding fantasy, to deny its genuine unhappiness. Thus 
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Edmund exclaims, “facts don’t mean a thing, do they? What you want to believe, 
that’s the only truth!”8 
The formation of symptoms (for example, depression) occurs exactly due to 
the simultaneity and the split between sense (truth) and fantasy in consciousness. 
In Long Day, James Tyrone uses whisky to drown his sorrows while Mary uses 
morphine to seek happiness. The symptom mirrors the truth of the subject’s being 
while it also intercepts truth so that “there is an internal veto, an internal no-saying.”9 
The symptom marks the return of the repressed truth but it also intercepts this truth 
by allowing the subject to defend and enjoy the fetishistic distortion. Lacan calls 
this the “identiﬁcation with the symptom.” As a result, Jacques-Alain Miller tells 
us, “we are used to considering that a symptom has a supplementing function, that 
is, we do not take the symptom as a dysfunctioning, we take it on the contrary 
as an apparatus which reestablishes functioning. It allows the subject to sustain 
himself in the world.”
The formula “subject-disavowal-symptom” can be seen in many O’Neillian 
classics such as Hairy Ape, Desire Under the Elms, and Mourning Becomes Electra. 
In Mourning Becomes Electra, the grandfather Abe Mannon changes from being an 
ordinary person to become an economic Man when he starts one of the ﬁrst “Western 
Ocean packet lines.”10 All the Mannons endorse a primary fetishism to see Capital 
as a mythical Thing. Money makes them posses a genuine sense of “fullness” even 
though the Mannons knowingly realize that the “Real” reality (libidinal chaos, 
political chaos, a warring world) cannot be solved by money. Eventually, the aloof, 
mask-like “Mannon face” bespeaks the triumph of the fetishistic fantasy. Hence, the 
servant Seth notices that the Mannons have “been top dog around here for near on 
two hundred years and don’t let folks forget it.”11 It is in this sense that even though 
all the male Mannons love the beautiful French nurse, they have to disavow their 
feelings for she signiﬁes a disruptive force that can destroy the Symbolic fantasy. 
David, the romantic, takes the leap to marry her, but he soon becomes ashamed of his 
connection with her and kills himself. In Hairy Ape, Yank, having little money, turns 
to an “enlightened” secondary fetishism to see the Capital as a “false Thing.” Yank 
represents the working subject who takes pride in his labour power and attempts to 
demystify the fetishistic illusion by sending people back to the Real (the dynamite 
and the zoo). While the worker aims at unveiling the empirical truth that the upper 
class/democracy is an ineffective system, little does he know that this attempt is 
actually a disavowal of his covert, materialistic fantasy. Hence Yank displays the 
classic hysterical symptom:  he gloriﬁes his work and bemoans his entrapment as 
a stoker, he denies the grandeur of the Capital and reiterates the impotence of his 
(cultural or ﬁnancial) poverty, he tries to be an independent person but calls for 
vengeance after noticing how the wealthy lady scorns him. Yank displays honesty 
when he says he wants to think but he simply can’t “t’ink.” Yank asserts that he is 
the Capital and the master of the society:  “I’m steel—steel—steel!,” the “steam 
and oil for de engines,” “de ting in gold dat makes money;”12 but the presence of 
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Mildred in white (and calling him a “ﬁlthy beast”) makes him become aware of 
and furiously deny his slave-like, impoverished status. As a result, O’Neill uses 
this play to foreground how the homeless subject, imprisoned by the Capital 
ﬁxation, wants to rebel against it. The tragic fact is that, after much pretence, the 
enlightened worker cannot relate his life to the Marxist worldview (the glory of the 
Labourer and a life of hardship/productiveness) or to the views of crude capitalism 
(the cult of class to hide the unproductive life of the privileged). The Hairy Ape’s 
death in the arms of the gorilla embodies the worker’s symptomatic “disﬁgured 
jouissance.” The impoverished Yank is disﬁgured by his work in the “stokehole,” 
and in turn his labour empowers him to distrust the capitalists. His enlightened 
consciousness brings a pseudo-independence to disavow the rich and the romantic 
(“all dat crazy tripe about suns and winds . . . dat’s all a dope dream”13). However, 
such thoughts clash with the ways of the world and his covert identiﬁcation with 
wealth, his hidden romantic desire to be loved by the pretty, “white-faced, skinny 
tarts.”14 Yank’s death does not denote the power of divine retribution but the futility 
of warring with his truth and symptoms. 
The O’Neillian romantic outlook is, at times, curiously akin to the logic of 
capitalism. In the ﬁrst place, the capitalist’s fetishistic consciousness always turns 
differences into a metaphoric convergence. For example, in the eyes of businessmen, 
all goods are in a way “alike” for they lead to the same thing—more Capital. 
Second, the concept of “exchange control” favours the occasional restriction of 
business deals with undesirable members in the particular area. Its function is to 
bar the conversion of valuable (home) assets into other (foreign) assets, thereby 
reducing the inﬂow of unwanted assets from abroad and keeping the money in 
one place. It is in this light that we can understand why O’Neill’s plays often 
dramatize the links between the primacy of Capital and the immoral, “inbound” 
(incestuous) romance. Most of his plays feature the presence of a potent patriarch 
around whom everybody revolves in the hope of capturing the paternal phallus. 
While the patriarch is excessively strict and invites the hatred of his wife, somehow 
the women all fall in love with the paternal privileges and the same masculine 
phallic face. Meanwhile, all the sons love-hate the father ﬁgure, end up longing 
to be rich and then going after the same phallic mother-ﬁgure. If Christine hates 
Ezra Mannon in Mourning, she loves Brant and Orin—who look exactly like Ezra. 
In Desire Under the Elms, all the males in the Cabot family go after the phallic 
Minnie, who alone possesses the potency to remain “purty” after all these years. 
Preposterous as these duplicated relationships may seem (Abe’s face is Ezra’s face 
is David’s face is Brant’s face is Orin’s face), the O’Neillian romance dramatizes 
the primitive functionings of capitalism:  everybody loves the same thing (or the 
same face, the paternal Capital), and good resources must be kept in one place 
(or one family, one society) for the sake of affective or ﬁnancial conglomeration. 
In Long Day, all sons fail to have substantial relations with women other than 
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Mary. To Christine and Vinnie in Mourning, no male faces can get their attention 
and only Abe-Ezra-Brant-Orin can capture their hearts. Orin also fails to see the 
loveliness of other women—only the maternal Christine and Vinnie seem to be 
the most lovable of women. The O’Neillian incestuous romance is structured like 
a ﬁnancial layout to forestall the outﬂow of wealth/emotions to other families and 
thereby safeguard the hegemonic enterprise. However, the irony is that it also leads 
to the family’s confusion and disintegration along blood/emotive lines. Instead of 
growth, it results in a drying up of wealth and emotions. 
If the Greek incest taboo is wrought with mythical impulse and ﬁxation, 
O’Neill’s plays have none of these characteristics for the incestuous logic is, in 
fact, a rational choice, an obsession for people who are too interested in “family 
property.” In Mourning, Captain Brant is back to claim his rights, Vinnie is envious 
of the mother’s rightful ownership of her husband, the mother is eager to keep the 
son’s affection for herself, and Orin is jealous of his sister’s suitors. Given the 
fact that the family portrayed by O’Neill is usually the wealthiest one in the area, 
following the notion of exchange control, the members deem that any inbound 
alliance can be proﬁtable to the self, while the outbound alliance is viewed in a 
hostile light. For example, the Cabot sons never want their father to remarry in 
Desire Under the Elms. Orin never likes the idea that Vinnie or Christine loves 
Brant in Mourning. As the obsessional organizes her enjoyment by protecting her 
“property” through envy, gossiping, feuding and defamation, Vinnie loses no time in 
being the informer to destroy her mother (just as Jamie loses no time to use his “vile 
tongue” to corrupt/attack his brother). If Electra kills her mother out of “Justice” (in 
Hegelian terms, the noble consciousness), what Vinnie displays is a pure ignoble 
consciousness as she uses the name of “Justice” to secure her paternal interests, to 
claim her idea of “rightful properties” (i.e., her father and her brother). 
To Lacan, the obsessional features a distinctive type of “self-disgusting” 
enjoyment that is centred on the question of Being and death. The obsessional’s 
wish is to justify its Being, to ﬁght lack/death by positing its Being to the quest of 
the “full,” phallic Thing. As this Thing is exactly not the “full,” joyful, mythical 
Thing in the Real, hence the obsessional tends to attach herself to a set of recurrent 
ideas, or rituals to reassure herself of her fullness, of having no disappointment or 
fear of death. However, the obsessional subject also feels a special burden of guilt, 
for example, Jamie Tyrone’s or Vinnie Mannon both know that their quests have 
violated the laws of ethics. In the O’Neillian context, the end of Mourning is not 
surprising as Vinnie savours her full Being (she owns the house, the capital, the 
men in the family) and the full, symptomatic force of guilt and lack. Her behaviour 
manifests the typical obsessional’s symptom when she chooses not suicide but 
perpetual procrastination to wait “for death.”15 On the one hand, this signiﬁes a 
gesture of self-punishment; on the other hand, this self-punishment is also turned 
by the subject to be the source of a new, self-disgusting jouissance. It marks the 
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obsessional’s classical choice of remaining with something that makes her suffer, 
of recognizing herself in the (joyful) suffering. It demonstrates the process of what 
Lacan calls the “identiﬁcation with the symptom, the reabsorption of the symptom 
in pleasure” (c.p. Miss Havisham in Great Expectations). The guilty obsession and 
the joy of self-ruin all lead to a fantasmal enjoyment that works this way:  while 
mourning signiﬁes a state of being in pain, the obsessional disavows lack and 
turns this into a state of self-fulﬁlment. The obsessional makes two simultaneous 
statements:  being in lack, “I am the most dead person in the world”; however, 
being dead, “I am now happy and immortal.” Thus, the obsessional celebrates 
the fantasmal joy of living a life beyond suffering as she is both the slave and the 
master of her traumatic experience. 
O’Neill’s Long Day’s Journey into Night is another classic example that 
illustrates how the lacunary subjects choose to disavow reality and embrace their 
s(ub)lime symptoms—in the form of madness, miserliness, alcoholism and drug 
addiction. The sublimity of symptoms lies in the subject’s welcoming a life decreed 
by a horrible union between nonsense and truth, a life that is self-wasting and 
“between the two deaths.” The Tyrones take refuge in their symptoms and thereby 
reproduce a recurring form of death and become the undead, the very emblem of 
pain, and the hallmark of a walking disaster.
The Birth of the Father
In a capitalistic society, a man is not a “Man” until he is subjectiﬁed by the 
monetary discourse. O’Neill has no hesitation in demystifying the “ugliness 
of American reality” behind the innocent discourse of the “American dream”. 
Unlike Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, O’Neill chooses not to romanticize 
the castrating effect of Money with a dreamy outlook, but to foreground how this 
unconscious language can regulate the living body. In the play, Mr Tyrone’s rise 
to prosperity represents the birth of the modern, masculine Subject—the economic 
Man. If the American society grants the status of a “master” to a wealthy man, 
Eugene O’Neill leads us to see that he is but a “victim” who has surrendered to 
the logic of the Other. O’Neill forces the reader to see that a man like Tyrone is 
“caught as a whole, but like a pawn” in the play of the capitalistic signiﬁer, “and 
this even before the rules are transmitted to him. . . .  Such an order of priorities has 
to be understood as a logical order, that is, as an always actualized order.” 16 While 
pleasure in itself may not be a linguistic phenomenon, the idea that Money can 
give pleasure is certainly related to “the ordering function of the culture, a culture 
that separates man from nature, by inscribing him from the start in language, in 
the founding law whose primordial interdiction” is that of the law of the father.17 
The fear of lack on the ontological level is translated by the capitalistic discourse 
to become Tyrone’s fear of poverty, the “fear of poorhouse.” In O’Neill’s play, Mr 
Tyrone has no hesitation in forgoing what he truly likes in order to accommodate 
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to the desire of the Other. With all his money, he ends up saying “I don’t know 
what the hell it was I wanted to buy.”18
O’Neill wants his reader to understand the importance of history; however, 
Tyrone’s confession narrative also leads us to see the boundary between history 
and story can be very thin. Old Mrs. Tyrone’s suffering may have a direct impact 
on James Tyrone, but it is not from Old Mrs. Tyrone that he learns how to be a 
“stinking miser.” The moment Mr.. Tyrone gets an extra-dollar, she spends it “all 
on food” to ensure the well-being of her family.19 It is in this sense that we see a 
person can disavow the past to explain away his self-disgusting jouissance. The 
“fear of poorhouse” is an excuse to justify his love of “second hand bargains in 
everything,”20 to accumulate wealth, to “memorize the level in the bottle after every 
drink.”21 It forgets the fact that the subject is not searching for a(n attainable) mode 
of existence to compensate his past, but actively seeking an insatiable symbolic 
enjoyment constructed by the Other. In the heat of pursing what he (or the Other) 
wants, the subject can use all kinds of reasons to turn anything into the quest for 
more money. Hence, Tyrone’s mother pushes him to see “the value of a dollar,” 
his love for Mary is “an added incentive to ambition.”22
The disavowal of all substantial relations for a symbolic happiness means that 
the Subject can effectively cut off the link between the self and its body, the self 
and the needs of the people around him. In Marini’s words, the subject favours “the 
submission to the imperious command of a terrible superego:  ‘Jouis!’ Both the 
other and the self are being put to death in the name of the Other.”23 Eventually, 
Mr. Tyrone’s master discourse valorises the word “expenditure” to “quilt” and 
totalize all his family relations into a readable set of ﬁgures. “Expenditure” is his 
dominant signiﬁer (S1) that can enslave everything (S2) so that all human relations or 
investment can be neatly arranged, thereby becoming easily measurable according 
to the notion of “growth” or “use value.” In Mr. Tyrone’s eyes, Jamie is an “evil 
minded loafer”24 because he is depraved and unproductive. Edmund is disappointing 
for he is weak in terms of his health or ﬁnancial well-being. As the master discourse 
allows the master to read reality lucidly, Mr. Tyrone is the only character in the 
play that is exempt from despair and confusion of values. Thus Mary notes, “Ten 
foghorns couldn’t disturb” Tyrone.25 To a miser like Tyrone, the world is a very 
stable, easily readable zone:  his enemy is the one who wants to “have the house 
ablaze with electricity at [night], burning up money!”26
For all his “fake pride and pretence,” James Tyrone recognizes the truth of his 
being a “stinking old miser.”27 He sells his talents for money, spends his money on 
many “bum piece[s] of property,” and ends up celebrating his life by drowning regrets 
with alcohol. The paradox of success and non-being, happiness and unhappiness 
eventually leads Tyrone to utter—with clear-headed sincerity—something that he 
really desires to do and never desires to put it into action:  “On my solemn oath, 
Edmund, . . . I’d be willing to have no home but the poorhouse in my old age if I 
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could look back now on having been the ﬁne artist I might have been.”28 It is in this 
sense that we know, in spite of John H. Raleigh’s interesting article, that Tyrone’s 
honest duplicity has nothing to do with the Irish “national concern with betrayal” 
or “Judas Complex.”29 On the contrary, the crux of Tyrone’s problems lies in the 
diseased enjoyment in the symbolic register. Wealth or success may bring a lot of 
pain, but the fetishistic illusion is “in himself more than himself.”
O’Neill gives us a masterly character whose words are characterized by “empty 
speeches”—for his entire being is oriented toward the discourse of the Other. To 
Lacan, the empty speech speaks mostly to the (phallic) Other, instead of voicing the 
self’s authentic needs or minding other people’s being. In the play, Mr. Tyrone is 
constantly talking in vain about someone who can never be at one with “his” wish: 
his sons are good for nothing, merely trying to use up all his money. At times, Mr. 
Tyrone talks to his wife, but he can only do so using the language of an actor:  “If 
I’ve watched you it was to admire how fat and beautiful you looked;” Mary has 
“the most beautiful hair in the world.” Her white hair only makes her “prettier than 
ever.”30 This quasi-romantic role-playing “dialogue” helps him disavow Mary’s 
suffering and deny his responsibility for her decline. While it allows readers to 
feel a momentarily tenderness toward Tyrone, we can feel that this romantic 
voice cannot be endearing for it bespeaks a “double bind performance” instead of 
genuineness.31 Mary knows that Tyrone “isn’t a great actor for nothing”—for he 
can say one beautiful thing though he intends to do another. The moment his bottom 
line resurfaces, it is about the importance of frugality:  “the glare from those extra 
lights hurts my eyes,” “there’s no use making the Electric Company rich.”32 In 
that light, any communicative words that affect the relational context can only be 
refuted by the unspoken communicative exchanges. Tyrone’s love for Edmund is 
genuine, but Tyrone cannot control his addictive miserliness. Hence, love means 
that he will still send Edmund to a doctor like Hardy because he “only charges a 
dollar.” James Tyrone disgusts himself, but no degree of self-disgust can change 
his love of bargains. His excuse is simple:  “[i]t is a late day for regrets.”33 
Galatean Femininity
Mary Tyrone represents another stout defender of the empty speech. In the 
play, Mary cannot talk to her family without using the girlish speech of the Other 
and she cannot appear in front of people without making a fuss about her hair. 
In other words, Mary represents the prototype of some women who cannot see 
themselves without ﬁrst having their images mediated through the judgmental eye 
of the Other. If Tyrone’s problem originates from his desire to ﬁll up the lacuna in 
the centre of being by having a Subject-identity, for Mary it is her relationality to 
people. It certainly dooms her project of becoming a nun—for a nun has to die to 
the worldly self constructed by and through the voices of the Other. Though alone 
in the house, Mary Tyrone is forever people-oriented for she always places/imagines 
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herself in the “object” position for others to admire. In the play, Mary’s love of 
being under the Other’s eye cannot be further away from the masculine notion of 
being a Subject. Mary says she loves playing piano, but the only thing she can 
remember is the nun’s opinion of her performance. What “Mother Elizabeth says” 
becomes an “acoustic mirror” (to use the words of Kaja Silverman) for Mary to 
construct her Being and mirror her fullness. The ultimate issue is—though it is 
inevitable that a person will be reduced to become a linguistic “object” in another 
person’s statement (the moment other people talk about “me,” the “I” enters into 
other’s conversation), O’Neill tells us that it is certainly unwise to put the Other in 
the Subject-position, thereby turning the self into a Galatean object (as in the myth 
of Pygmalion) who can only come into Being if the Other admires her. It can do 
no one any good if the self has to constantly seek unity through the eyes/language 
of the Other, or by asking questions such as “what do you think of me?” or “do 
you like my hair?” 
Given the relational nature of this objectiﬁed self, we can understand why the 
hysteric always appears to us in the form of a question poser. Gérard Wajcman says 
the “hysteric’s enunciation is injunctive:  ‘Tell me!’”34 By letting the Other occupy 
the Subject-position, the self not only intensiﬁes its docile dependence on the Other, 
but also heightens its discontent—for the self knows very well that the “me” in the 
Other’s eye (as a linguistic construct) can neither represent the “I,” nor portray the 
asymbolic facet of the self. As the libidinal body cannot be the body in the Other’s 
statement, the questions come back again and again—much to the annoyance of the 
Tyrones.35 O’Neill’s representation of Mary certainly mirrors a woman’s ontological 
dilemma:  a woman is constantly forced to learn a male-centred language that is 
not her own. At school, she is under the eyes of the nuns. In a patriarchal family, 
she has to let her father, brother, and husband occupy the Subject-position, while 
she herself valorises the voice of the Other for the afﬁrmation of her being. If the 
master admires her, the little girl/wife—like Galatea in the Pygmalion story—will 
feel revived immediately. In this light, it is no wonder that Mary will fall for Tyrone 
at once—for he is exactly the eloquent master who can verbally construct her state 
of being, and give her a sense of fullness. He is handsome and vocal, so Mary is 
happy to let Tyrone speak, and let the stereotypical, coquettish, girlish speech 
speak for her. The opening scene gives a wonderful illustration of the function of 
the Galatean teasing speech:  Mary lures Tyrone to inform her of her looks, to pay 
compliments to her, to become his object of desire, to let him become her master, 
and to playfully defy his master status/authority (what I am is not what you say), 
hereby giving her a pedestal status (as an object) and an imaginary deﬁance (as 
a subject). 
Things soon turn sour for Mary. Tyrone—like most husbands—is the absent 
master in the domestic sphere. Mary is left alone in shabby hotels without knowledge 
of her status as no one bothers to put her in a body of statements. Meanwhile, Mary’s 
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body suffers much as James Tyrone knowingly puts her under the care of a “cheap 
old quack.” In Long Day, we can see how the double bind behavioural pattern 
keeps doubling itself:  Mary learns from James Tyrone that his input is always 
contradictory (i.e., loving words will not lead to caring investment, or taking her 
for a night out). And Mary’s conﬂicting feelings towards her family owe much to 
her prolonged exposure to people who say one thing while they mean another. 
 
James leans over and kisses her cheek impulsively—then turning 
back adds with a constrained air.
So keep up the good work, Mary.
 MARY
Has turned her head away.
I will, dear.36
It reenacts the classic situation: the wife says she loves her husband when 
she instinctively turns away from him—because his words of trust actually belie 
a deep distrust of her. Mary says Tyrone “has made [her] very happy” so she can 
“forgive so many other things,” then she accuses herself for being a “sentimental 
fool” because she “was much happier before [she] knew he existed.”37 Mary senses 
that Edmund is dying, but she speaks with a “strange obstinate” expression that 
she knows he is only having “summer colds.” The gap between the enunciated 
content and the nonverbal message is further shown in Mary’s reaction to Jamie. 
Jamie tries to reach for his mother, but she draws away from him, as she does from 
Edmund and James. To understand why Mary cannot speak her mind, we have to 
turn not only to Mary’s relationality with the Other but also to the mechanics of 
a Galatean communication. On the one hand, words transmit information on the 
communicative level; on the other hand, the Galatean discourse decrees a self-
regulated deference to the presence of the Other. The self has to heed the wish 
of her “creator” so that she can play out a role expected of her. It is in this sense 
that we can understand why she hates Tyrone and her wedding dress, and yet, she 
cannot let them go. In the play, Tyrone’s ways of conveying conﬂicting messages 
more or less simultaneously can only teach Mary to do her share of contradictory 
behaviour. The moment she hears her family is back, her face shows “defensive 
stubbornness” and resentment, but she bids them welcome with these words:  “I 
am so happy you’ve come. . . . I’m all the more grateful to you for coming home. 
I was sitting here so lonely and blue.”38 In short, she says what is expected from 
her in order to make her family love her and make her relational self happy. Her 
genuine feelings and voice are disavowed. 
To forget this painful bond, Mary chooses the morphine discourse for it can 
give her a symptomatic enjoyment while the hallucination can treacherously restore 
and preclude relationality. Under the inﬂuence of the drug, Mary can keep thinking 
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about the Other while shutting out all interactions with the outside world. Her foggy 
speeches are like dreamy soliloquies as she further otherizes herself, refuses to hear 
words spoken by her family, but imaginatively hunts down the Other’s view of her, 
and explains to those imaginary Pygmalions why she is as she is, and why she fails 
their expectations. At the end of the play, Edmund tells her that it is not a summer 
cold that he has, but consumption. Mary says “No” to stop further communication. 
Her words are devoted to the imaginary Other:  “I play so badly now. I’m all out of 
practice, Sister Theresa will give me a dreadful scolding.” “I’ll practice every day 
from now on. But something horrible has happened to my hands. The ﬁngers have 
gotten so stiff—”39 It is easy for readers to realize that the morphine narrative is a 
fully ﬂedged false history in the hope of re-presenting herself as a lovely object to 
the judging eyes of the paternal Other, of winning their sympathy/admiration, of 
explaining away her present failures. In the play, the signiﬁcance of Mary’s “hands” 
and “wedding dress” can carry several functions:  in reality, they are but mundane, 
functional objects. However, in Mary’s imaginary discourse, they stand for two 
romantic dreams that now end in disappointment and self-pity (i.e., “You know 
that I could have been . . . but now I am . . .”). Talking to the imaginary Other, she 
invites the Other to side with her and hate the Tyrones as she visualizes showing 
her ugly, swollen knuckles to Sister Martha in the Inﬁrmary. Talking to herself, 
these two objects contribute to her self-defeating stance (“I can’t . . . for my ﬁngers 
are useless now . . . Sister Theresa will blame me”). Here, the imaginary Other 
changes sides and is now against her. As a result, Mary hates herself. Eventually, 
her bipolar love-hate, for-against attitude towards her self and the Other leads her 
to a stubborn insistence on self-loss:  she wants to become “absent-minded”:  “I 
am always dreaming and forgetting.”40 
Mary’s morphine language reinforces her love of a disﬁgured jouissance. She 
ﬁrst takes up an “innocent” position, demands to be recognized as an effect of the 
nun’s pedagogic discourse or Tyrone’s romantic language; then she disavows this 
self-objectifying position, reveals that a religious vocation never fulﬁls her longing 
(“a waste of time”), Tyrone’s patriarchal discourse cannot satisfy her (she was only 
happy “for a time”).41 However, Tyrone is also responsible for her suffering and 
her disﬁgured ﬁngers. Behind the masks of an innocent tone, it marks a victim’s 
bitter accusation of her love and need of the Other, and of her lost opportunities. 
Eventually, morphine leads her to ask a typical hysteric’s question:  “What is it I’m 
looking for?” The dreamy soliloquy tricks the lonely wife into becoming the ideal 
reader of her (falsiﬁed) history, pushes others to fall in with her perspective instead 
of interpreting them (even though Mr. Tyrone painfully contradicts her version and 
says Mary is “never made to renounce the world” for she “was a bit of a rogue 
and a coquette”42). However, this self-interpreting language can only heighten the 
disjunction between the subject and the object-position—for no answer can satisfy 
her. She is barred from feeling like a docile object and from being contented with 
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her sons’ reassuring answers. She cannot ﬁnd any joy in the self-subjectifying 
(false) explanation of her past and present. As Mary is so used to setting her face 
“in an expression of blank, stubborn denial,”43 She ﬁnds pleasure in a life full of 
fog and self-disﬁgurement. 
Post-Oedipal Envy
Castrated by Tyrone’s (ﬁnancial) Law, Jamie struggles to stage his ineffective 
“guerrilla warfare” against the paternal power.44 Meanwhile, Oedipal complex 
and sibling rivalry join forces to produce a self-destructive parasite who quarrels 
incessantly with his father, wastes away his life, and corrupts the well being of his 
brother. Jamie’s position bespeaks the dilemma of an elder son:  on the one hand, 
the elder son hates his father, but he cannot ignore the phallic signiﬁer (Money) 
which forces him to become a Subject. On the other hand, even though the brothers 
join hands to ﬁght the father, Jamie cannot forget his hatred of Edmund—for his 
parents favour the young one over himself. James M. Mellard has long pointed out 
how, in modern times, family conﬂicts can change from a father-son confrontation 
to a brother against brother situation.45 As the sons can no longer afford to kill the 
rich father, rivalry breaks out among the brothers owing to their competing desire 
to become the Man and inherit the family property.
At ﬁrst, the relationship between brothers is constructed along fraternal lines. 
However, Mellard notes that one of them will gradually rise to a quasi-paternal 
position to provide guidance and insight to the younger one. Finally, the new 
father-brother destroys or corrupts his peers by seeking a surplus jouissance for 
himself—while offering no cultural, ﬁnancial protection to the young. In Long 
Day, James and Edmund’s relationship mirrors how the brotherly conﬂict can be 
as bad as paternal oppression. Jamie represents the “brotherly” desire to establish 
an egalitarian “play-oriented” discourse to replace Mr. Tyrone’s paternal doctrines. 
To a certain extent, the love of “play” is not unlike Lacan’s idea of the “university 
discourse” for “play” is by nature carnivalesque:  it cuts across class boundaries, 
subverts the authority of the father, allows the self to adopt the multiple roles of 
being a father-ﬁgure to the young, a truth-seeker to analyze his family’s situations. 
Jamie can be a hedonist who throws his “salary away every week on whores and 
whiskey,”46 he is also an enlightened man who challenges his father’s decision of 
sending Edmund to another “cheap quack” like Hardy. Jamie can also be a bitter 
ironist:  adores “Broadway” and the pinnacle of success means that he will “be the 
lover of the fat woman in Barnum and Bailey’s circus.”47 Through abusive critique 
and truthful analysis, this playful discourse gives the self a new freedom to mingle 
noble and ignoble values, blend the Shakespearean high culture with lowbrow 
curses, repudiate the corruptive values of the father—while engaging with these 
selﬁsh practices to corrupt the brother. 
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Jamie’s “play” is in fact an equivocal game that refutes his father’s inﬂuence 
while the play discourse is necessarily tied to the world of Money and to the master 
discourse (“the winner”). For all his liberating gestures, Jamie looks down on 
Edmund, considers him “still wet behind the ears.”48 Jamies hates his father, but 
he has to count on Mr. Tyrone for help in sorting out all his ﬁnancial troubles. The 
playful discourse allows Jamie to pose himself as an imaginary Hero to Mamie 
Burns, a mentor to Edmund, a rebellious ﬁgure who knows how to heal himself 
with the comfort of wine and sex. This “self-fathering” role is so well disguised 
that, unless he is in need of money, Jamie can cynically worship himself, and 
leads Edmund to worship him. However, the father knows very well that the elder 
son is no hero for Jamie has not “the guts to go off on his own,” Jamie always 
came “whining to [him] the minute he was broke.”49 In fact, the interdependent 
closeness between the father and son is witnessed by their abusive communication: 
a descriptive remark is immediately followed by a hostile remark, but it will always 
gravitate towards a resigned conversation. For example, Jamie hates his father for 
digging up the fact of his being expelled from every college he attended, Jamie 
ends in admitting that “he is a bum” to end the quarrel. Then they will go out and 
work together on the front hedge.
O’Neill tells us that, despite the liberal facet of “play,” Jamie actually shares 
the paternal love of competition and dominance—yet he does it without the father’s 
love of honour and labour. Michael Manheim notes that, at ﬁrst, there was a healthy 
“brotherly camaraderie and competitiveness” for the young Tyrones share “the time-
honoured cynicism of educated youth.”50 However, Jamie’s fear of non-dominance 
gets the better of him and his jealousy shows in the form of wanting his family’s 
love all for himself. Hence he constantly represses his brother, wants him “to fail” 
and accuses Edmund of being “Mama’s baby! Papa’s pet!” His evil intention (“I 
did it on purpose”)51 cannot be further away from the egalitarian assumption of 
“play.” For whatever Jamie does, he moralizes his (decadent) behaviour with a 
cynical, equivocal guise so that whatever good things his father wills him to do, 
he does it not; and whatever bad things he wills himself to do, he moralizes it till 
he feels he has a good conscience. Tyrone tells Jamie to get a decent job, Jamie 
chooses to gamble his money away as a playful gesture of “resistance.” And the 
moment Jamie hears that Edmund is now a decent writer, he feels threatened and 
says Edmund is only “a pretty bum reporter.”52 The father-brother always disguises 
his malice with a deﬁant, nonchalant gesture; however, Jamie cannot hide it from the 
judgemental eye of Mr. Tyrone—though he has successfully attracted his brother’s 
gaze. Jamie knows that Edmund looks up to him as a “hero,” and he deliberately 
corrupts him with all his cynical mottos:  “every man was a knave with his soul for 
sale, and every woman who wasn’t a whore was a fool.”53 In turn, this playfulness 
becomes a game to hide his self-disgust, his will to dominance and envy. Jamie 
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actually will do his “damnedest to make [Edmund] fail,” to make Edmund “look 
even worse by comparison.”54 
The confession of Jamie is a touching scene, but it can only horrify us for the 
post-Oedipal tie can be more oppressive than the patriarch’s regime. In the words 
of Mellard, the post-Oedipal “regime reconstitutes the thanatic jouissamce of the 
totemic father.” We can interpret this statement in the following way:  if the ancient 
totemic father dominates every woman, suppresses all his enemies to guarantee the 
lifecycle/productivity of the society, “the new father-brother offers no advantages 
to children, cultural others or women—for example, it disavows or denies entirely 
female desire, if not female existence as the sister.”55 What the father-brother aims 
at is an anti-social enjoyment that is on the side of murder or theft. Whoever he 
loves, he has to possess/kill it, with no thought of responsibility or social conscience. 
In the play, Jamie murders his career, says he feels like a “corpse” in the house. 
However, like a “dead man,” he has “to kill the thing he loved.” As a result, he 
is secretly happy that Mary and Edmund are heading for a fall—because a dead 
person “wants company.”56 This envious, (self-)disgusting, symptomatic jouissance 
can only alert us to the dangers of the post-Oedipal subject. The subject simply 
endorses the ruthless way to arrogate all desire to himself—even though he loves 
those people that he is corrupting, and hates those objects that he desires. Instead 
of welcoming the father’s superego, the brother uses the “id” to form the basis of 
thanatic jouissance. Tyrone tortures everybody (including himself) to follow his true 
love (Money); however, for the sake of his id, the post-Oedipal subject has no ﬁxed 
object of love or hatred. Jamie loves Edmund, but he will also “give [Edmund] the 
glad hand, and at the ﬁrst good chance [he] will stab [Edmund] in the back.”57
The Failure of Poetic Sublimation
In Long Day’s Journey into Night, Edmund represents the ultimate hope of 
countering the fetishistic illusion. However, this hope has no future, as symbolized 
by Edmund’s having tuberculosis, and his journey to a cheap sanatorium. With a 
strong feeling of alienation and anxiety, Edmund represents the rise of a poetic 
subject who is capable of producing his own language to formulate a new identity. 
Unlike Jamie and Tyrone’s habitual quoting of words from Kipling, Swinburne 
or Shakespeare, Edmund invents his own speech to give voice to his feelings. In 
the words of Frederic Carpenter, “Edmund Tyrone, seemingly passive, develops 
steadily, although unobtrusively, during the play until at the end he achieves what 
O’Neill had prophesied for his autobiographical hero:  “the birth of a soul.”58 His 
independent lifestyle constitutes a radical break with the Tyrones’ way of saying 
one thing while meaning another, or their addictive blaming of each other for 
their present suffering. With the sun, the sand and the hot seaweed, Edmund puts 
aside the lethal jouissance of money, envy or drugs. He is portrayed to be the only 
character who can savor the world in the Real fullness:  nature gives him an “ecstatic 
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freedom,” the “saint’s vision of beatitude.” However, while this full speech marks 
his authentic existence, Edmund’s voice is death-bent: 
 
It was a great mistake, my being born as a man, I would have 
been much more successful as a sea gull or a ﬁsh. As it is, I will 
always be a stranger who never feels at home, who does not really 
want and is not really wanted, who can never belong, who must 
always be a little in love with death.59
If Jamie’s joy lies in the destruction of the Other for the capture of the empty fetish 
(more money, more sex, intense competition), Edmund’s notion of enjoyment is 
far more destructive in the sense that it is truly anarchic. The fullness of being 
is closely linked to the thanatic jouissance of death. It marks a total disavowal 
of resistance, for the “ﬂight” discourse foregrounds a pseudo-solution that is at 
best, anti-reality, and at worst, anti-life. With Edmund’s radical ‘stammering,” he 
unveils the ennui of a life trapped between sense and non-sense, truth and foggy 
dishonesty. However, such poetic vision only pushes Edmund to further disavow 
or reinvent the painful life with the erasure of all boundaries between the surface 
and the latent meanings, truth and falsehood. Thus Edmund says, 
I want to be alone with myself in another world where truth 
is untrue and life can hide from itself. . . . The fog and the sea 
seemed part of each other . . . As if I was a ghost belonging to 
the fog, and the fog was the ghost of the sea..60
While these poetic signifiers allow a moment of pseudo-transcendence or 
liberation, this vision can only prompt readers to realize a diseased, self-mutilating 
jouissance—the self is to be a ghost in a fog, which in turn is the ghost of the sea. 
It welcomes a collapse of identity, a confusion of being in non-being, an inﬁnite 
regress (regrets) in the great chain of life, an elation of death/loss in the cosmic 
union. Instead of ﬁghting for life, Edmund identiﬁes with his symptomatic illness 
and aestheticizes the beauty of ﬂight and death (to be “in another world”). The lack 
of health and hope is turned around to become a celebratory event, an anticipation 
of fullness in ex-istence. This language is genuinely problematic for it aims not at 
validating critical confrontation but at afﬁrming deformation as transformation—
thereby uniting the fog with the joy of amnesia, dreams with “ecstatic freedom.” 
It is no wonder that Mr. Tyrone calls it “morbid ﬁlth.”61
O’Neill said he wrote Long Day’s Journey “with deep pity and understanding 
and forgiveness for all the four haunted Tyrones.” However, pity and understanding 
do not lead to a Freudian sublimation or “fatal balance” (to use the words of 
Doris Falk62). The ending of the play mirrors the tragic subjects’ simultaneous 
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recognition of their truth and the insistence on their lethal, symptomatic jouissance. 
No accusation can wake Mr. Tyrone up from his desperate miserliness, no acoustic 
mirror or reassuring words can rouse Mary to return to reality. Meanwhile, no honest 
confession from Jamie can ever change his self-corrupting game of envy, and no 
poetic discourse can push Edmund to restore his faith in life. The dying Edmund 
wills himself to “always be a little in love with death.”63 With the Tyrones’ total 
commitment to the enjoyment of miserliness, dominance, drugs, wine, sex and 
morbid thoughts, O’Neill’s play shows how the modern subjects’ slime symptoms 
erupt in the form of a sublime downward spiral. The “faithful realism” of Long 
Day is not about “stammering” being the “native eloquence” of “fog people,”64 
but about the all too human choice—the decision of enjoying the night and coping 
with denials and symptoms instead of braving the dawn of metanoia. 
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